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Background: Healthcare systems are challenged by a demand that exceeds available resources. One policy to meet
this challenge is task substitution-transferring tasks to other professions and settings. Our study aimed to explore
stakeholders’ perceived feasibility of transferring hospital-based monitoring of stable glaucoma patients to primary
care optometrists.
Methods: A case study was undertaken in the Rotterdam Eye Hospital (REH) using semi-structured interviews and
document reviews. They were inductively analysed using three implementation related theoretical perspectives:
sociological theories on professionalism, management theories, and applied political analysis.
Results: Currently it is not feasible to use primary care optometrists as substitutes for optometrists and ophthalmic
technicians working in a hospital-based glaucoma follow-up unit (GFU). Respondents’ narratives revealed that: the
glaucoma specialists’ sense of urgency for task substitution outside the hospital diminished after establishing a GFU
that satisfied their professionalization needs; the return on investments were unclear; and reluctant key stakeholders
with strong power positions blocked implementation. The window of opportunity that existed for task substitution
in person and setting in 1999 closed with the institutionalization of the GFU.
Conclusions: Transferring the monitoring of stable glaucoma patients to primary care optometrists in Rotterdam
did not seem feasible. The main reasons were the lack of agreement on professional boundaries and work domains,
the institutionalization of the GFU in the REH, and the absence of an appropriate reimbursement system. Policy
makers considering substituting tasks to other professionals should carefully think about the implementation
process, especially in a two-step implementation process (substitution in person and in setting) such as this case.
Involving the substituting professionals early on to ensure all stakeholders see the change as a normal step in the
professionalization of the substituting professionals is essential, as is implementing the task substitution within the
window of opportunity.
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Healthcare systems across many countries face a challenge
in responding to growing demands for physicians’ and
nurses’ care with increasing limitations on human and fi-
nancial resources [1,2]. Extrapolations have shown that the
number of physicians cannot keep pace with the growth in
demand caused by ageing populations, enhanced societal
expectations, and new diagnostic technologies [3-6].
One option to cope with workforce shortages is task
substitution, which can be defined as devolving clinical
responsibilities to lesser or more narrowly-trained health
professionals with or without supervision. [7] Task sub-
stitution can be realised with people (e.g., a diabetes
nurse practitioner substitutes for an internist of the
same department), settings (e.g., a primary care neurolo-
gist substitutes for a hospital-based neurologist), or both
(e.g., primary care midwives substitute for hospital-based
gynaecologists). Research has shown that task substitu-
tion may improve the quality of care [8-23] and reduce
costs because substitutes’ fees are lower [24]. Strong evi-
dence for cost savings is lacking however, perhaps be-
cause physician-substitutes perform additional tasks [25]
or are less productive [26], offsetting potential cost sav-
ings. Furthermore, the successful implementation of task
substitution is at least partially influenced by contextual
factors, such as local stakeholder interests [27-30],
power positions [31,32], and the structure of the health-
care system, including its financing [33]. It therefore
seems worthwhile to broaden the scope of evaluation
and include the professional, organizational, financial,
and political contexts within which task substitution is
implemented [34].
We explored a task-substitution project involving glau-
coma care at the Rotterdam Eye Hospital (REH) in the
Netherlands (see Additional file 1 for background infor-
mation). Our research question was two-tiered: how do
stakeholders perceive the feasibility of implementing task
substitution of person (from ophthalmologists to allied
health professionals) and setting (from a hospital to a
primary care setting), and what are their supporting and
opposing arguments?
Historical background
Our case study was not the first initiative of the REH to
cooperate with primary care optometrists working in op-
tical shops in the Rotterdam area (later united in a Col-
lective of Optometrists in Rijnmond Region – OCR).
The first initiative, started in 1997, led to the Transmural
Glaucoma project (TG-project), a preliminary person
and setting task substitution project in 1999. One part of
the project consisted of primary care optometrists sup-
plementing glaucoma specialists in monitoring glaucoma
patients by means of GDx-technology (Carl Zeiss Medi-
tec, Dublin, CA, USA), an imaging tool to assess(damage to) the nerve fibre layer. REH glaucoma
patients were referred to a local primary care optom-
etrist for three additional tests between two visits to the
hospital-based glaucoma specialist. It appeared difficult
to convince patients to visit a primary care optometrist;
only twelve of the twenty patients (60%) actually did so
[35,36]. Nor were glaucoma specialists eager to partici-
pate because they could have referred more patients.
Given the results, the REH management suspended
the project and initiated an intermediate step of task
substitution of person only. The REH set up a Glaucoma
Follow-up Unit (GFU) in the hospital and evaluated its
impact through an RCT [37]. The GFU was staffed by a
hospital optometrist and ophthalmic technicians who
monitored the glaucoma patients according to a working
protocol (Additional file 1). Four years after the success-
ful implementation of the GFU [37], REH managers
began the step of substituting primary care optometrists
in optical shops for the GFU, as in the original plan
(substitution of person and setting).
Methods
An in-depth single case study evaluation was carried out
from September 2007 to August 2008 using semi-
structured face-to-face interviews and a document re-
view to explore the feasibility of using primary care
optometrists in optical shops as substitutes for in-
hospital GFU employees.
Sampling and recruitment
Semi-structured interviews
We selected 27 participants based on role, profession,
and organization, thereby drawing on three sampling
strategies. First, we included all four REH glaucoma spe-
cialists, five GFU employees, and the responsible hos-
pital managers (CEO, CFO, manager of the Eye Care
Network, and the advisor concerned with optometry
relations). Second, we used convenience sampling to
identify five primary care optometrists and two repre-
sentatives of the major health insurers in the Rotterdam
region. We contacted the Dutch Healthcare Authority to
identify potential participants. Third, we randomly
selected five patients who had participated in the GFU
study, taking care that the sample included patients with
only a risk factor for glaucoma as well as stable glau-
coma patients and employed as well as unemployed
patients. One patient was selected because of his func-
tion as chairman of the Dutch Glaucoma Patient Associ-
ation. The sample is shown in Table 1.
Document review
Relevant policy and administrative documents were con-
tinually collected during the study period (2004 to 2009).
Their sources were suggested by participants or found on
Table 1 Interviewed stakeholders
Staff Rotterdam Eye Hospital
Respondent Position Interviewers
1 CEO Rotterdam Eye Hospital ES & TP
2 CFO Rotterdam Eye Hospital KHG & TP
3 Manager of the Eye Care Network KHG & ES
4 Advisor concerned with optometry relations ES
5 Glaucoma specialist, Rotterdam Eye Hospital ES
6 Glaucoma specialist, Rotterdam Eye Hospital ES & TP
7 Glaucoma specialist, Rotterdam Eye Hospital KHG
8 Glaucoma specialist, Rotterdam Eye Hospital KHG
9 Ophthalmic technician, Rotterdam Eye Hospital KHG
10 Optometrist, Rotterdam Eye Hospital ES
11 Ophthalmic technician, Rotterdam Eye Hospital ES
12 Ophthalmic technician, Rotterdam Eye Hospital KHG
13 Ophthalmic technician, Rotterdam Eye Hospital KHG
Primary care optometrists
Respondent Self-employed / optical chain Participant OCR Interviewers
14 Self-employed Yes KHG
15 Self-employed Yes KHG
16 Self-employed Yes ES
17 Optical chain No TP
18 Self-employed Yes TP
19 Optical chain Yes ES
Patients
Respondent Travelling distance to REH (in kilometres) Working status Severity of the disease Interviewers
20 21 Employed Risk factor TP
21 19 Unemployed Glaucoma ES
22* 75 Employed Glaucoma TP
23 14 Employed Risk factor KHG
24 18 Unemployed Suspect KHG
Health insurers / The Dutch Healthcare Authority
Respondent Position Interviewers
25 Health insurer (Health insurance only) ES & MK
26 Health insurer (All kinds of insurances) KHG & TP
27 Senior policy advisor of The Dutch Healthcare Authority KHG
* chairman of the Dutch Glaucoma Patient Association; REH = Rotterdam Eye Hospital.
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KHG selected the documents when they considered any
part of them relevant to the research question. Selected
documents included public information, official policy
reports, minutes of meetings, and working documents.
Procedure
Two researchers conducted the first six interviews to-
gether because it allowed them to give each other feed-
back on the interviewing process. The remaininginterviews were done by one of four researchers (KHG,
EvS, TP, MK). We developed a topic list (Additional file 2)
based on the research question to guide the interviews,
which contained open questions that left room for partici-
pants to expand and clarify their answers. Moreover, they
had the opportunity to express their opinions and to share
what was important to them concerning the feasibility of
transferring glaucoma care to primary care optometrists.
The interviews took approximately one hour each, were
audio recorded, and later transcribed verbatim.
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The transcripts of interviews and documents were induct-
ively analysed for the respondents’ views regarding the
feasibility of the task substitution. We thereby used an ana-
lytic approach, drawing on three theoretical perspectives.
First, we used sociological theories on professionalism to
explore professionals’ views and interprofessional dynamics.
Professions are sociologically defined as groups of institu-
tions that permit the members of an occupation to make a
living while controlling their own work [38]. From such a
sociological perspective, implementing task substitution is
not a technical solution, but rather a social process affecting
the professional status of those involved [38-42]. Key to our
analysis was how hospital-based glaucoma specialists, pri-
mary care optometrists, and GFU employees viewed the
feasibility of the desired task substitution, and how it related
to opportunities for or threats to controlling their work.
Second, we applied management theories to explore
managerial rationales and views underpinning the desired
substitution of tasks. Research shows that evidence-based
interventions to improve quality of care are not automat-
ically implemented and returns on investments or so-
called ‘business cases for quality’ are often absent or too
small to be effective [43]. Moreover, an organizational in-
frastructure should be in place to support the innovation.
Here, we explored how the respondents viewed the busi-
ness case for the task substitution and whether they
thought an appropriate infrastructure was in place.
Third, applied political analysis was used to map the
interests and power positions of each stakeholder involved
[31]. Their interests regarding the task substitution (sup-
porting or opposing) together with their power positions
and willingness to use them structure the political feasibil-
ity of successful implementation of task substitution.
Ensuring rigour
We used different strategies to monitor and enhance the
rigour of data collection, analysis, and validity. First, we
validated key findings by data triangulation. Data collected
from different sources (semi-structured interviews, docu-
ment analysis, and literature) and researchers were com-
pared to verify specific findings. Second, we sought
feedback from senior and other researchers (peer review;
HL, MK, NK), who critically appraised the research process
and earlier drafts of the article. Third, reflexivity of the main
researchers (KHG, TP, and EvS) was applied to rule out
threats to validity due to reactivity and researcher bias.
Results
Our threefold data analysis showed that it is currently not
feasible to implement task substitution in this particular
case. Respondents’ narratives revealed that the intermedi-
ate establishment of a suitable hospital setting (the GFU)
in 2004 pre-empted the original sense of implementationurgency. Nor did the professionals (ophthalmologists and
GFU employees) consider the shift to shop setting a posi-
tive step towards further professionalization. An unclear
return on investment did not help matters. Last, the
power positions of reluctant key stakeholders were strong
enough to block the implementation of task substitution
from the hospital to the primary care setting. Table 2 con-
trasts the initial assumptions of the stakeholders with the
perceived feasibility as expressed by the participants.
Closed window of opportunity
The analysis from the professionalization perspective
revealed that the window of opportunity for task substitu-
tion closed with an intermediate step, i.e., establishing the
GFU. In the late 1990s, waiting lists (demand pressures),
new GDx technology, and competition from ophthalmolo-
gists working in private clinics all favoured the task
substitution of both person (from ophthalmologists to
optometrists) and setting (from hospital to primary care).
Professional dynamics, however, impeded the twofold im-
plementation strategy.
The first step (substitution within the hospital setting –
the GFU) eased the pressures on the glaucoma specialists,
and the GFU employees enjoyed their work. As a conse-
quence, the glaucoma specialists and GFU employees no
longer supported the final step, which was implicitly
reflected in the debate on the expertise of primary care
optometrists.
Optometrists’ subtle and constructive views confirmed
that quality of care was perceived to be the most important
factor for the feasibility of the task substitution. All six pri-
mary care optometrist-interviewees were convinced of their
capability to monitor stable glaucoma patients (Table 3) be-
cause during the TG-project and the TOZ-project (trans-
mural eye care for all indications) some participating OCR
optometrists gained experience in screening patients and
strengthened their relationships with REH ophthalmolo-
gists, and they were trained to detect pathological abnor-
malities of the eye.
Some primary care optometrists indicated, however, that
they would like to have more routine monitoring of glau-
coma patients to bolster their initial education (Table 3). In
response, the REH organised training guided by glaucoma
specialists for the optometrists participating in the TG-
project. Optometrists interned for several days, studied a
textbook, and were tested before they could participate.
Despite this training, glaucoma specialists and GFU
employees were, due to their experience during the TG-
project in the late 1990s, not convinced of the primary care
optometrists’ expertise. The glaucoma specialists doubted
whether the quality of care delivered by optometrists would
be comparable to GFU employees despite the additional
education. The glaucoma specialists were furthermore
Table 2 Stakeholder positions concerning the task substitution of person and setting before and after GFU
establishment
Theory 1: closed window Theory 2: unclear returns on
investments
Theory 3: power position - level
interest
Before GFU
establishment
Glaucoma
Specialists
High workload, increasing
demand for glaucoma care.
Workload release, decreasing the
waiting list, more challenging work.
High power position and high
interest for a successful task
substitution.
Management REH Increased competition on
volume.
Increase in volume of (new) patients. Medium power position and high
interest for a successful task
substitution.
Primary care
optometrists
Competition with optical chains,
chance to professionalize.
Increase in volume of (new) patients. Low power position and high
interest for a successful task
substitution.
Patients Were not involved at the start. More flexible appointments and more
time per appointment.
Medium power position and
medium interest for a successful
task substitution.
Dutch Health Care
Authority / Health
insurers
Were not involved at the start. Care would possibly become less
expensive
High power position and unclear
interest for a successful task
substitution.
GFU employees Were not involved at the start. Low power position and low
interest for a successful task
substitution.
After GFU
establishment
Glaucoma
Specialists
Release of workload due to GFU. The establishment of the GFU already
fulfilled their goals.
Reduction of interest for a
successful task substitution.
Management REH Better alternative was found
through cooperation with
optical chain.
Disappointing increase in volume due
to cooperation with OCR. Alternative
was found.
Reduction of interest for a
successful task substitution.
Primary care
optometrists
Cooperation remained on the
same level.
Increase in new patients differed
among optometrists.
Reduction of chance to strengthen
relationship with glaucoma
specialists
Patients GFU resulted in more time per
patient, and care in a familiar
setting.
Reduction of interest for a
successful task substitution.
NZA / Health
insurers
Quality of care in GFU was good. No changes in interest due to
establishment of GFU.
GFU employees Improved relationship with
glaucoma specialists and more
satisfying work.
The consequences of starting task
substitution for the GFU were unclear.
Increase of power position.
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hospital setting and feared losing control over their patients
in an outpatient setting (Table 3).
Having the GFU staffed by hospital optometrists instead
of primary care optometrists further reduced the likelihood
that the task substitution to primary care optometrists
would succeed. Besides eliminating the sense of urgency
for task substitution of person and setting, establishment
of the GFU strengthened the bond between the glaucoma
specialists and GFU employees, closing the window of op-
portunity for task substitution of person and setting.
Unclear returns on investments
The stakeholders doubted whether the monitoring of
stable glaucoma patients by primary care optometrists
would still be financially interesting, i.e., the return on in-
vestment was unclear (see Table 4). The high workload of
the glaucoma specialists, which sparked the initiative, wassignificantly reduced by the establishment of the GFU in
2004. Increased capacity made it possible to lift the ban
on accepting new glaucoma patients, which resulted in a
23% increase from 2004 to 2008. Two glaucoma specia-
lists indicated that the increase in capacity eliminated the
pressure to further pursue task substitution. Moreover,
one underlying key assumption proved to be untrue. The
REH management assumed that the task substitution
would increase capacity and inflow of new patients. But in
2008 the primary care optometrists within REH’s eye care
network were responsible for only 1% of the new patient
inflow. The collective OCR organization was furthermore
rudimentary: the optometrists were mostly self-employed,
and could not be easily approached as a group. For both
reasons, the REH started collaborating with a large optical
chain to ensure a steady inflow of new patients.
This new collaboration put a strain on the REH-OCR
collaboration. The optometrists had seen the monitoring
Table 3 Quotations ‘closed window of task substitution’
Stakeholder Quotation
Primary care optometrists:
• As an optometrist you have done everything during your training, you have seen all the abnormalities, you have
read and learned about them, and you graduated. (Respondent 14)
• Considering our experience in the TOZ project (transmural eye care), in my opinion, we are capable of providing,
without any problems, part of the care for stable glaucoma patients and patients with a risk factor for glaucoma.
(Respondent 15)
• We don’t see enough glaucoma patients to monitor them. Even though it can occasionally occur, I do think that
we need to get more practical experience of these patients on a daily basis. If we start monitoring patients, we
have to know how the eye hospital wants it to be done, how they do it, and what they exactly want to know. This
can only be achieved through training. By watching glaucoma specialists at work. (Respondent 19)
Glaucoma specialists and GFU
employees:
• To me, the GFU is a good system because I do have some idea of the quality being delivered. And I think that is
essential to know. I am not in favour of transferring this care to optometrists who work outside of the REH,
because then I'm not sure what the quality of their care will be. (Glaucoma specialist, respondent 7)
• Unfortunately, we have had quite some bad experiences with a number of primary care optometrists. A small
number, but quite bad experiences. They were playing at being doctors, without having the knowledge. That’s
what I’m concerned about. (Glaucoma specialist, respondent 8)
• I still see the quality of care of these optometrists on a weekly basis (TG project), and I think that this group is not
suitable for monitoring these patients. I still see too many assessments, where they say, there's nothing wrong, and
where I think: well there is definitely something wrong. (GFU employee, respondent 9)
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tical chains because they could not compete with them
on the price of eyewear. On the other hand, some pri-
mary care optometrists were unsure about the competi-
tive advantage of membership in the REH’s eye care
network. Despite their belief that monitoring glaucoma
patients would provide work diversity, whether it would
result in additional clients or income was unclear.
The combination of an unclear effect of eye care net-
work membership with the absence of a separate reim-
bursement tariff for optometric examinations rendered
the monitoring of glaucoma patients financially un-
attractive for primary care optometrists.
In the absence of a reimbursement tariff for an opto-
metric examination, most patients did not choose pri-
mary care, because they would have to pay (directly or
indirectly) for care that otherwise was reimbursable. Be-
sides, some patients claimed that they relied more on
the glaucoma specialists than the primary care optome-
trists. Such considerations outweighed the advantages of
the optometrists’ care, such as flexible appointments and
proximity to patients’ homes.
Health insurers could mediate between primary care
optometrists and the REH to realize shared care and pro-
vide an appropriate reimbursement tariff, but were at the
moment of evaluation in 2008 reluctant to initiate discus-
sions. They claimed, however, that if the REH could guar-
antee the quality of care and if physicians supported the
substitution, they would seriously consider recommending
reimbursement of primary care optometric examinations
to the Dutch Health Care Insurance Board.The Dutch Healthcare Authority mentioned another prob-
lem in this regard: the realization of a tariff for an optometric
examination would result in additional costs for health
insurers and their clients because such tasks (monitoring
stable glaucoma patients) were also financed for hospital-
based glaucoma specialists. This was, however, a temporary
problem as the reimbursement of glaucoma monitoring by
glaucoma specialists became negotiable in 2009 [44].Power positions and level of interest
In Table 5 we summarised the stakeholder positions by
mapping their willingness to participate in the task sub-
stitution and their power positions.
The REH management initially wanted to transfer visits
of stable glaucoma patients to primary care optometrists
with the conditional support of the Dutch Healthcare Au-
thority, patients, and health insurers. The conditions of
the Dutch Healthcare Authority included accessibility and
affordability of care (Table 6). Although patients saw bene-
fits of the task substitution, like faster and more flexible
appointments and shorter travelling times, they were not
likely to visit primary care optometrists if they had to pay
for care that would have been otherwise reimbursed
(Table 6). The reimbursement could be accelerated by the
health insurers, but they stood with the patients, arguing
that they were only willing to cooperate if glaucoma spe-
cialists and the Health Care Inspectorate were fully behind
the task substitution.
Only one glaucoma specialist preferred the situation of
having stable glaucoma patients monitored by primary
Table 4 Quotations ‘Unclear returns on investments’
Stakeholder Quotation
Glaucoma Specialists:
• I: But it is getting busier with glaucoma patients, and you cannot discharge everyone. R: That's why we
created this system, the GFU. I: Do you think that is enough? R: I think so. (Respondent 6)
• If the pressure, the number of patients at the clinic increases, and we have to announce waiting lists again or
limit the number of patients at some point, then it will not be beneficial to the quality of care. Then we'll have
to do something like that [task substitution], we'll have to go down that road. (Respondent 8)
REH Management:
• What we do is, we move the chronic patients. Those patients are not financially attractive, not for the
partnership either. So to make it financially attractive, we need to see new patients, we must get referrals.
(Respondent 1)
• Primary care optometrists only send 1% of our referrals. So we need to arrange the other referral channels.
(Respondent 3)
Primary Care Optometrists:
• But when an optical chain joins, it makes us less unique. And as an independent optical shop, we take
optometry very seriously. (Respondent 16)
• Yes, there are customers who come to our shop, even if I do not know them personally. . . I have not seen
them before, but they ask during their visit to the REH where they can buy spectacles, etc. Then they are
referred to me, which is really great. (Respondent 16)
• I: As regards the fact that you are part of the Eye Care Network, do you use it, put a sign on the door:
‘Optician, member of the Eye Care Network’? R: Um, good question. Hardly. I: Why not use it? R: Because it has
no effect. I: How do you deduce that? R: Instinctive, advertising is purely instinctive. (Respondent 18)
• If you ask me what I think needs to be done, then I think health care insurers are keeping out of the way and
do not take enough action in this matter. I think that when it comes to eye care, the health care insurers
should accept their responsibility. (Respondent 18)
Dutch Healthcare Authority / Health
care insurers:
• When it comes under the B segment (tariff becomes negotiable) the health care insurer will say: we no longer
pay for the part of the DBC delivered by primary care optometrists, because we are already paying those
optometrists directly. That is a possibility. Then the Dutch Healthcare Authority does not have to set a price.
(The Dutch Healthcare Authority, respondent 27)
• If the reason for your question is: would we insurers be prepared to contract an optometrist, to agree on a
tariff and let him be responsible for this care; that is something I would be prepared to consider. But on the
condition that the quality of care is guaranteed, that the Health Care Inspectorate is confident about it, and
above all that the referring glaucoma specialists have confidence in it. (Health care insurer, respondent 25)
Patients:
• I think it is a bit more reassuring when you stay under your doctor’s care, of course. A specialist is probably a
bit more knowledgeable. You're so used to it. (Respondent 24)
• In some ways, care by a local optometrist might be nicer. The ophthalmologist with his experience and
knowledge might see certain things very quickly, though. But I have the impression that at the GFU they have
a bit more time for you, they want to know things exactly and are more precise than the doctor.
But still, if I have the choice between one and the other and they are both of good quality, then I would
choose the one that doesn’t cost me anything. (Respondent 23)
Table 5 Summary of the stakeholder positions
Stakeholders Support / opposition Power-position
REH management Moderate support Medium
Glaucoma specialists Strong opposition High
GFU employees Strong opposition Low
Primary care optometrists Strong support Low
Patients Neutral Medium
Health insurers / Nza Neutral High
Holtzer-Goor et al. Implementation Science 2013, 8:14 Page 7 of 10
http://www.implementationscience.com/content/8/1/14care optometrists. The remaining three specialists and
most GFU employees were not in favor.
The OCR optometrists supported the task substitution
of monitoring stable glaucoma patients at their shops
because the task substitution would improve their pro-
fessional image and strengthen their competitive posi-
tions relative to other optometrists. Their power
position, however, was relatively weak due to the OCR’s
low degree of organization and the self-employed state
of most of their optometrists, unlike, for example, large
optical chains. The role of the primary care optometrists
was therefore relatively passive (Table 6).
Table 6 Quotations ‘Power positions and level of interest’
Stakeholder Quotation
Management REH:
• With respect to glaucoma care, we have started to investigate whether apart of the activities that take place
here could be substituted to optometrists who are closer to the patient’s home. (Respondent 2)
• I: What is your opinion about substitution of eye care to other professionals?
R: If we did not agree, we would not put so much energy into it. (Respondent 1)
The Dutch Healthcare Authority /
Health care insurers:
• It looks like it would be more accessible than going to see a doctor. In that respect it seems to be in the
interests of the patient. It seems like a good development. (The Dutch Healthcare Authority, respondent 27)
Patients:
• Yes, I thought it was safe, so I thought, well, if the doctor says so. I simply trust him, so you go along with it.
(Respondent 21)
• I think it is a bit more reassuring when you stay under your doctor’s care, of course. A specialist is probably
a bit more knowledgeable. You're so used to it. (Respondent 24)
Primary care optometrists:
• Yes, there is a professional group, but I never hear anything about it. A great deal would have to be done
there. So I'm afraid that that is also a factor. (Respondent 18)
Glaucoma specialists:
• So you need to move forward with small steps, take the lead yourself. Then you have to get clear results
which you can show, and once you have these, you can gain the trust of others to do it. (Respondent 7)
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glaucoma specialists and health insurers. Although the
health insurers supported the idea of task substitution,
they did not intend to initiate discussions about the es-
tablishment of tariffs for primary care optometrists un-
less the REH could guarantee quality of care. Besides,
insurers believed the active support of the glaucoma spe-
cialists important, as did most patients. Thus, the substi-
tution of person and setting would not succeed in the
short term. Even the most enthusiastic glaucoma special-
ist affirmed this (Table 6).
Discussion
Transferring the monitoring of stable glaucoma patients
to primary care optometrists did not seem feasible in the
Rotterdam area in the period 2004 to 2011, despite other
studies indicating that (primary care) optometrists can
provide high-quality care [8-20,37]. The implementation
turned out to be the stumbling block as the involved
professionals quarrelled over professional boundaries
and work domains, they disagreed on the capabilities of
primary care optometrists, the assumed returns on in-
vestment were unclear after all, and power positions
favoured the status quo.
The three theoretical perspectives used in our case
study align very well with the implementation literature
that broadly acknowledges that implementation of an
innovation can be difficult and a well-designed imple-
mentation process is critical [33,38,39,45-49].Our results can be explained by classical theories on im-
plementation, financial incentives, and stakeholder inter-
ests. From implementation theories, for example, it could
be expected that ophthalmic examination by primary
optometrists would be difficult without reimbursement,
because the current situation (no reimbursement) differed
from the desired situation (with reimbursement) [46]. A
second example is the failure to enhance ophthalmolo-
gists’ perceived benefit of the innovation by staffing the
GFU with primary optometrists at the outset, because that
would have reduced the uncertainty about the future situ-
ation, which is very important to let the task substitution
succeed [33].
This study also taught us two theoretical lessons that
might influence the implementation literature. First, the
findings highlighted the merit of connecting the imple-
mentation literature with sociological theories on profes-
sionalism, which is also acknowledged by Adler et al.
(2009). A key notion for understanding the feasibility of
the task substitution was recognizing the path dependency
of the professionalization of the occupations involved.
There was indeed a window of opportunity for the task
substitution at the outset because ophthalmologists were
pressured to make professional relationships and domains
more fluid. The intermediate step of the GFU fixed the
professionalization processes, and the pressures were
sufficiently relieved. Thus, being aware of (local) pro-
fessionalization processes combined with good timing
seem crucial for successfully transferring tasks from one
Holtzer-Goor et al. Implementation Science 2013, 8:14 Page 9 of 10
http://www.implementationscience.com/content/8/1/14professional group to another. Combining implementation
literature with sociological theories on professionalism
[38-42], we can say in general that it is crucial to involve
the substituting professionals early on to ensure that
stakeholders see the change as a normal step in the
professionalization of the substituting professionals.
Second, the study underscores the importance of time
element; windows of opportunity may disappear over
time. In Rotterdam, the accumulation of (local) dynam-
ics proved the assumed benefits of the task substitution
wrong in the end. The assumption that cooperation with
primary care optometrists would increase the inflow of
new patients appeared incorrect. Besides, the assumed
financial benefits were unclear. Because only hospital
visits were reimbursed, primary care optometrists had to
monitor stable glaucoma patients for free, charge
patients for the examination, or organise a payment by
the REH, all of which reduced its benefits. The last pos-
sibility would be to create a separate tariff for monitor-
ing glaucoma patients by primary care optometrists, but
the power positions of key stakeholders did not support
this. Implementation scientists thus should not under-
estimate (the effect of ) changing aims and interests of
the different stakeholders over time because they often
do change. It is therefore crucial to make the right deci-
sions at the right time to obtain the expected result.
Conclusions
National and local factors hamper transferring the respon-
sibility to monitor stable glaucoma patients from the
REH’s GFU to primary care optometrists in an outpatient
setting. Task substitution in person and in setting is there-
fore not feasible in the short term in the Rotterdam area.
Unlike the primary care optometrists, most hospital-
based glaucoma specialists over time were unwilling to
collaborate in the scheme. Moreover, the REH manage-
ment’s enthusiasm for the task substitution waned when
its aim shifted from cooperating with primary care opto-
metrists towards increasing the inflow of new patients, as
the demand could be met with the newly established and
successful hospital-based GFU.
Policy makers considering substituting tasks to lesser
trained professionals as well as substituting the delivery
of services from a hospital to a primary care setting
should carefully think about the implementation process,
especially when they decide to implement task substitu-
tion in separate steps. Our case study demonstrates that
professional, financial, managerial, and political factors
all play a role in rendering task substitution feasible and
that consolidating task substitution within a hospital set-
ting will freeze the opportunity to transfer to a primary
care setting. Recognizing a restricted window of oppor-
tunity in the implementation of task substitution is
critical.Additional files
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